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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This Reply Brief is intended to address the State's assertion on appeal that the 
district court "reached the right result, albeit under a different theory" when it denied 
Mr. Erickson's challenge to the State's use of peremptory challenges only on men, 
because the State articulated "a credible, gender-neutral reason for the method by 
which it exercised its peremptory challenges." (Respondent's Brief, p.5.) Mr. Erickson 
contends that the State did not provide a reasonably specific gender neutral reason for 
its challenges and that the State did in fact exercise its peremptories in a discriminatory 
manner. 
In this Reply Brief Mr. Erickson will also address the Idaho Supreme Court's 
recent decision in State v. Severson, 2009 Opinion No. 75 (May 29, 2009) (petition for 
rehearing pending), finding that "errors not objected to at trial that are not deemed 
fundamental may not be considered under the cumulative error analysis." Mr. Erickson 
contends that even in light of this decision, prosecutorial misconduct should be 
reviewed cumulatively to determine if it is fundamental error, even if this Court finds that 
each episode of unobjected to prosecutorial misconduct did not amount to fundamental 
error by itself. (See Appellant's Brief, p.46.) 
Mr. Erickson refers this Court back to his original Appellant's Brief for his 
arguments on the remaining issues argued in the Respondent's Brief. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the State violate Mr. Erickson's and the jurors' right to equal protection when 
it used its peremptory challenges to only strike men from the jury? 
2. Did the prosecutor's misconduct in this case violate Mr. Erickson's rights to due 




The State Violated Mr. Erickson's And The Jurors' Rights To Equal Protection When It 
Used Its Peremptory Challenges To Only Strike Men From The Jury 
The State has conceded that Mr. Erickson met his burden of establishing a prime 
facie showing that the State's peremptories were exercised in a biased manner, in this 
case against men. (See Respondent's Brief, p.4.) However, in response to 
Mr. Erickson's arguments on appeal, the State asserts that the district court "reached 
the right result, albeit under a different theory" arguing that the State articulated "a 
credible, gender-neutral reason for the method by which it exercised its peremptory 
challenges." (Respondent's Brief, p.5.) The State also argues that "given that Erickson 
never addressed the gender-neutral explanation, and that the gender-neutral 
explanation was credible and reasonable in light of the circumstances and nature of the 
alleged crimes, the district court correctly rejected Erickson's objections, albeit based on 
an incorrect legal theory." (Respondent's Brief, p.5.) Mr. Erickson contends that the 
State did not provide a reasonably specific gender neutral reason for its challenges as 
required by Batson and its progeny. Furthermore, despite the State's assertion 
otherwise, Mr. Erickson was not required to address the State's gender neutral 
explanation, but rather the district court was required to determine whether the reason 
offered by the State overcame the inference of discrimination established by 
Mr. Erickson, and if the district court had properly done this it would have determined 
that the State did in fact exercise its peremptories in a discriminatory manner. 
First, the State was required to give a clear and reasonably specific gender 
neutral explanation for its "legitimate reasons" for the exercise of each its challenges, 
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not merely provide a credible, gender-neutral reason for "the method" used in exercising 
its challenges as the State asserts. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n.20. 
(1986); see also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 239 (2005) (quoting Batson's 
language that "the prosecutor must give a clear and reasonably specific explanation of 
his legitimate reasons for exercising the challeng[e]."). In Batson, the Court specifically 
stated that the State's burden cannot be met by general assertions that its officials did 
not discriminate, or deny a discriminatory motive, or argue good faith in making each 
selection. Id. at 94, 98. The Court also noted that "a neutral explanation related to the 
particular case to be tried" must be articulated. Id. at 98. 
Furthermore, in Miller-El v. Cockrell, the United States Supreme Court 
emphasized that the reasons of the State do not stand on their own, but are viewed in 
context, stating the defense can "rely on 'all relevant circumstances' to raise an 
inference of purposeful discrimination. Id. at 241. In Miller-El, the Court looked at the 
reasons given for excluding certain black jurors and similar responses given by white 
jurors in determining that the peremptory challenges were being exercised in a 
discriminatory fashion. See id. generally. The Court noted that "[i]f a prosecutor's 
proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar 
nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful 
discrimination to be considered at Batson's third step." Id. at 241. 
Additionally, the defense is not required to specifically address the gender neutral 
explanation offered by the State, as the State asserts. (Respondent's Brief, p.5.) The 
third focus of the inquiry turns to the district court weighing the evidence already 
presented by both sides. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. The Supreme Court has noted 
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that "even if the State produces only a frivolous or utterly nonsensical justification for its 
strike" the analysis proceeds to step three, where the court must determine "the 
persuasiveness of the defendant's constitutional claim." Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 
162, 168, 171 (2005). 
Here the district court erroneously concluded that white males were not a 
protected class and exercising all peremptories against men did not violate Batson. 
(Trial Tr., p.60, L.10 - p.61, L.7.) Implicit in that finding is that the State was 
intentionally striking white males based on their gender, but the district court did not 
believe this mattered because it believed white males where not a protected class. 
(Trial Tr., p.60, L.10 - p.61, L. 7.) However, even if the district court did not reach the 
third part of that analysis, the State offered no reasonably specific reasons for its 
peremptory challenges, giving only a broad generalized statement that it exercised its 
peremptories based on the voir dire and questionnaire that best favored the State and 
that it wanted parents and grandparents on the jury. (Trial Tr., p.40, L.19 - p.42, L.2.) 
The State also stated that it had "no response" to defense counsel's challenge and that 
he did not believe that there was a presumption of gender bias because someone 
struck only male or only female jurors. (Trial Tr., p.40, L.19 - p.42, L.2.) Notably, in 
their voir dire answers juror number 31, who was later struck by the State, described 
himself as having foster children, and juror number 34, who was also struck by the State 
with a peremptory, explained that he had two son-in-laws in law enforcement, thereby 
implying that he had children as well. (Trial Tr., p.83, Ls.15-19, p.152, Ls.14-16; R., 
p.247.) Therefore, the fact every single peremptory exercised by the State was against 
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men, indicates that he peremptories were being exercised in a biased manner based on 
the gender of the jurors, violating Mr. Erickson's and the jurors right to equal protection. 
11. 
Mr. Erickson's Rights To Due Process And A Fair Trial Were Violated By The 
Prosecutorial Misconduct Committed In This Case 
In the Appellant's Brief, after arguing the several comments by the prosecutor 
were misconduct amounting to fundamental error, Mr. Erickson also argued "[e]ven if 
this Court finds that each episode of prosecutorial misconduct did not amount to 
fundamental error by itself, the prosecutor's conduct when viewed cumulatively, did 
amount to fundamental error, depriving Mr. Erickson of his right to a fair trial." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.46 citing State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 21, 189 P.3d 477, 483 
(2008). Recently, in State v. Severson, 2009 Opinion No. 75 (May 29, 2009), the Idaho 
Supreme Court stated, "errors not objected to at trial that are not deemed fundamental 
may not be considered under the cumulative error analysis" when determining whether 
all of the errors found in Mr. Severson's trial resulted in cumulative error. Severson, 
p.37 (citing State v. Higgins, 122 Idaho 590, 604, 836 P.2d 536, 550 (1992).)1 
Mr. Erickson continues to assert that this Court should review the prosecutor's errors 
and irregularities cumulatively to determine whether the prosecutor's misconduct 
amounted to fundamental error depriving Mr. Erickson of his right to a fair trial. 
Mr. Erickson contends that the Idaho Supreme Court's citation to State v. Higgins in 
Severson for the proposition that before a cumulative error analysis · would be 
undertaken the error must first be found to be fundamental, is misplaced because the 
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rule and statute requiring the appellate court to disregard harmless errors do not require 
the court to ignore an accumulation of errors affecting a defendant's right to a fair trial 
and no decision of the Idaho Supreme Court has ever required that error be 
fundamental before the cumulative error doctrine would apply. 
1) The Rule And Statute Requiring The Appellate Court To Disregard 
Harmless Errors Do Not Require The Court To Ignore The Accumulation 
Of Errors That Affect A Defendant's Right To A Fair Trial 
Pursuant to Rule 52 of the Idaho Criminal Rules "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity 
or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." The Idaho 
Criminal Rules were adopted on December 27, 1979, by the Idaho Supreme Court and 
became effective on July 1, 1980. I.C.R. 59; Brooks v. State, 108 Idaho 855, 857, 702 
P.2d 893, 895 (Ct. App. 1985). Prior to the adoption of the Idaho Criminal Rules, Idaho 
prohibited vacating a judgment upon minor errors or mistakes, requiring reversal only 
when an error or mistake actually prejudiced a defendant's substantial rights. See 
I.C. § 19-3702, see also State v. McBride, 33 Idaho 124, 190 P. 247 (1920). 
Therefore, neither the rules, nor the statute specifically authorize reversal based 
on the accumulation of harmless errors. Nevertheless, cumulative error makes logical 
sense when analyzing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. In Berger v. United States, 
295 U.S. 78, 88-89 (1935) overruled on other grounds by Stirone v. United States, 361 
U.S. 212 (1960), the United States Supreme Court noted that importance of reviewing 
the prosecutor's arguments as a whole and considered the misconduct cumulatively 
stating, "we have not here a case where the misconduct of the prosecuting attorney was 
1 
· A petition for rehearing in State v. Severson Docket # 32128 is currently pending 
before the Idaho Supreme Court at the time of this writing. 
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slight or confined to a single instance, but one where such misconduct was pronounced 
and persistent, with a probable cumulative effect upon the jury which cannot be 
disregarded as inconsequential." Id. at 89. 
In State v. Field, the Idaho Supreme Court articulated the standard by which the 
appellate courts review individual acts of prosecutorial misconduct. 144 Idaho 559, 571, 
165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007). First, the prosecutor's actions are reviewed to determine 
whether they constitute misconduct. Id. The prosecutor's actions are considered 
without regard to whether they were objected to by defense counsel. See id. This is so 
because: 
"[e]very person accused of crime in Idaho has the right to a fair and 
impartial trial," State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 504, 616 P.2d 1034, 1040 
(1980), "whether guilty or innocent," State v. Fowler, 13 Idaho 317, 89 P. 
757 (1907). We long ago held, "It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that 
a defendant has a fair trial, and that nothing but competent evidence is 
submitted to the jury." State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 44, 71 P. 608, 611 
(1903). They should not "exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far they 
can trespass upon the verge of error, [because] generally in so doing they 
transgress upon the rights of the accused." Id. 
State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463,469, 163 P.3d 1175, 1181 (2007). "Prosecutors 
too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court, and that they occupy 
an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their 
statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury 
than they will give to counsel for the accused." State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, _, 71 P. 
608, 610 (1903). The prosecutor's duty is to see that the defendant has a fair trial by 
presenting only competent evidence and by avoiding the presentation of evidence to 
prejudice the minds of the jury. Id. The prosecutor must refrain from deceiving the jury 
by use of inappropriate inferences. Id. 
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When evaluating individual errors of misconduct, the Field Court held that when 
the defense objects, the misconduct will be reviewed for harmlessness. Field, 144 
Idaho at 571, 165 P.3d at 285. When the defense fails to object, prosecutorial 
misconduct will first be reviewed for fundamental error, and then if fundamental, the 
misconduct will be reviewed for harmlessness. Id. In vacating the defendant's 
conviction, the Field Court determined that although "joinder of the offenses, the 
admission of H.P.'s out of court statements, and the introduction of Anderson's 'bad 
acts' testimony were improper, and [that one act of] prosecutorial misconduct" were 
harmless independently, cumulatively, the errors resulted in a denial of a fair trial. Id. 
The Court took particular issue with the improper joinder, and, therefore, did not reach 
the issue of whether the accumulation of prosecutorial misconduct deprived a defendant 
of a fair trial, which is a substantial or fundamental right. 
The plain language of the rule and the statute, along with existing case law, do 
not require the Court to ignore the accumulation of harmless errors that deprive a 
defendant of a fair trial. A fair reading of the rule demands that the accumulation of 
errors which deprive a defendant of a fair trial shall not be disregarded. Mr. Erickson 
submits that this Court should utilize the rule to evaluate whether the accumulation of 
misconduct deprived him of a fair trial. 
2. The Supreme Court's Development Of The Cumulative Error Doctrine 
Although neither the court rules nor statutes have specifically adopted the 
cumulative error doctrine, this Court has. The appellate courts first discussed the 
doctrine of "cumulative error" in a 1983 Court of Appeals' Opinion. See State v. 
Campbell, 104 Idaho 705,662 P.2d 1149 (Ct. App. 1983). In Campbell, the defendant 
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argued that the inappropriate admission of evidence, improper testimony, and the 
prosecutor's comments in closing arguments about certain facts not admitted into 
evidence, cumulatively constituted more than harmless error requiring reversal. Id. at 
719, 662 P.2d at 1163. Citing to a New Mexico case, the Idaho Court of Appeals held 
that the accumulation of irregularities, each of which in itself might be harmless, may in 
the aggregate deprive a defendant of a fair trial. Id. The court explained the difference 
between harmless error and cumulative error, finding that the latter refers to the number 
of errors which prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial, whereas the former refers 
to technical errors not requiring reversal. Id. (citing to State v. McKenzie, 608 P.2d 428, 
448, cert. denied 449 U.S. 1050 (Mont. 1980).) The Campbell Court analyzed the 
alleged errors and affirmed the judgment of conviction. Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court first addressed the "cumulative error doctrine" in a 
post-conviction action. Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430, 725 P.2d 135 (1986). The 
majority dismissed the petitioner's cumulative error argument finding that regardless of 
the claim that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's cumulative errors, the petitioner's 
story at trial was "unbelievable" as found by two separate juries and one trial judge. Id. 
at 435, 725 P.2d at 140. In analyzing the petitioner's prosecutorial misconduct claim, 
the Court did not review whether the accumulation of prosecutorial misconduct errors 
deprived the petitioner of a fair trial. Id. at 436-437, 725 P.2d at 141-42. However, the 
dissent recognized the district court's failure to conduct a cumulative effect analysis, 
stating, "[t]o hold error harmless, the Supreme Court must declare its belief, beyond a 
reasonable doubt that there was no reasonable possibility that the errors complained of 
contributed to the defendant's conviction." Id. at 448, 725 P.2d at 153 (emphasis 
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added) (Huntley, J., dissenting). The dissenters concluded that although individually the 
errors discussed may have been harmless, they could not conclude that the 
accumulation of the errors did not contribute to the conviction. Id. 
In the next Idaho Supreme Court case, the Court conducted a cursory evaluation 
and concluded that because no errors occurred during the trial, the cumulative error 
doctrine did not apply.2 State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 603, 768 P.2d 1331, 1336 
(1989). Although the majority failed to find any errors and, thus, could not evaluate the 
accumulation of errors, Justice Bistline disagreed. Id. at 606-607, 768 P.2d at 1339-
1340 (Bistline, J., dissenting). The dissent would have found the errors individually to 
be harmless, but when considered in the aggregate, the dissent found the errors 
complained of warranted a new trial. Id. at 606-607, 768 P.2d at 1339-1340 (Bistline, J., 
dissenting). 
Subsequently, in 1989, this Court adopted Campbell's distinction between 
harmless error and cumulative error. State v. Missamore, 119 Idaho 27, 32, 803 P .2d 
528, 533 (1990). Harmless error refers to the technical violation, whereas cumulative 
error refers to the number of errors, which deprive a person of a fair trial. Id. The 
Missamore Court determined that several of the prosecutor's questions and the 
witnesses' answers were irrelevant and impermissible opinions. Id. The Court held that 
it could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the 
2 Since 1990, the Idaho Supreme Court has held in a number of appeals that when no 
errors are made during the proceedings, the cumulative error doctrine has no 
application. See State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 568, 199 P.3d 123, 143 (2008); 
State v. Joslin, 145 Idaho 75, 83, 175 P.3d 764, 772 (2007); State v. Sheahan, 139 
Idaho 267, 286, 77 P.3d 956, 975 (2003); State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 
278, 297 (2003); State v. Jones, 127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 P.2d 67, 70 (1995); State v. 
Grube, 126 Idaho 377, 387, 883 P.2d 1069, 1079 (1994). 
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same result had the errors not occurred. Id. It is unclear whether the court determined 
that the errors were not harmless individually or whether the Court felt the accumulation 
of all the errors deprived the accused of a fair trial. Id. 
Since, Missamore, this Court has clarified when the cumulative error doctrine 
applies and when it warrants relief.3 Because an accused is constitutionally entitled to a 
fair trial, not an error-free trial, the accumulation of errors do not necessarily warrant 
relief. See State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998). Id. The 
Moore Court concluded that the accumulation of the errors in the case did not deprive 
the accused of a fair trial. Id. 
Moreover, in order for the cumulative error doctrine to apply, there must be merit 
to more than one error. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 65-66, 106 P.3d 376, 391-92 
(2004), see also State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 286, 77 P.3d 956, 975 (2003). 
Notably, the Dunlap Court did not require the error to be fundamental, in considering the 
cumulative error doctrine. Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 65-66, 106 P.3d at 391-92. 
Later, in State v. Stevens, the Idaho Supreme Court refused to apply cumulative 
error doctrine to an appeal from the denial of a motion for new trial, making clear that 
3 In an anomaly, this Court held that individual errors waived below would not be 
considered under the cumulative error analysis. State v. Lewis, 126 Idaho 77, 83, 878 
P.2d 776, 782 (1994). The Lewis Court refused to analyze the waived errors, but did 
consider two errors that were preserved for appeal, and determined that because it 
found no actual error, the cumulative error doctrine did not apply. Id. The defendant 
had waived a claim that the prosecutor deprived him of a impartial jury by failing to 
exercise all of his preemptory challenges and failing to object to what the court deemed 
to be a potential proper line of questioning during the voir dire. Id. at 81, 878 P .2d at 
780. The Lewis Court relied on Tenth Circuit case holding, "'cumulative-error analysis 
should evaluate only the effect of matters determined to be error, not the cumulative 
effect of non-errors."' Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1471 (10th 
Cir.1990) (en bane).) 
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the appropriate standard was an abuse of discretion. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 
148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). Although this Court previously recognized that 
"harmless error" and "cumulative error" were distinct and separate concepts, see 
Missamore, 119 Idaho at 32, 803 P.2d at 533, the Stevens Court merged the two, 
declaring that before the cumulative error doctrine would apply there would have to be 
one error deemed harmless. Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148, 191 P.3d at 226 (citing 
State v. Field, 144 ldaho 559, 572-73, 165 P.3d 273, 2896-87 (2007).) 
In Severson, the Idaho Supreme Court relied on State v. Higgins, 122 Idaho 590, 
836 P.2d 536 (1992), for the proposition that "errors not objected to at trial that are not 
deemed fundamental may not be considered under the cumulative error analysis." 
Severson, p.37. However, the only discussion regarding cumulative error by the 
Higgins' Court was as follows: "Higgins also asks this Court to grant a new trial based 
on the cumulative error doctrine. Because we find no error in this case that was 
preserved for appeal, we conclude that the cumulative error doctrine does not apply." Id. 
at 604, 836 P.2d at 550. No other discussion of the cumulative error doctrine is 
contained in the opinion. In evaluating the errors alleged by Higgins, he was unable to 
argue the totality of the prosecutorial misconduct, whether objected to or not, deprived 
him of a fair trial. Regarding prosecutorial misconduct he alleged that the State 
inappropriately coached the victim/witness. Id. at 597, 836 P.2d at 543. The Court 
found that there was no evidence that the prosecution improperly influenced the victim's 
testimony. Id. Thus, the Higgins Court concluded there was no error at all, not that the 
error was not preserved. The other misconduct alleged involved the State's failure to 
produce two video taped interviews with the alleged victim. Id. at 597-598, 836 P.2d at 
13 
543-44. The Court found that no error existed as to the later video tape. Id. As to the 
earlier non-disclosed video tape, the court found that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by not disclosing the tape, but that the misconduct was harmless. Id. Thus, 
under the prosecutorial misconduct allegations, this Court only found one instance of 
misconduct and, therefore, the accumulation of misconduct could not be evaluated. Id. 
at 604, 836 P.2d at 550. Thus, a conclusion that because the misconduct was not 
fundamental the cumulative error doctrine does not apply, is unwarranted based on 
Higgins. 
Therefore, Mr. Erickson submits that the proper inquiry when discussing a 
prosecutorial misconduct "cumulative error" claim should be whether the accumulation 
of any and all irregularities or errors, regardless if objected to or not, aggregately 
deprived the defendant of a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Erickson respectfully requests that his conviction be vacated and his case 
remanded for a new trial. 
DATED this 20th day of August, 2009. 
'A HE M. CA D 
Deputy State Appe I e Public Defender 
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